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Abstract:
The aim of this article is to critically analyse the methodological standpoint of 
Joseph Raz in his research on law. The basic assumptions of Raz’s antinatural-
ism are presented in the first part of this work. Particular attention is paid to the 
concept of reason, as it is a crucial feature of his explanation of law. The second 
part of the paper contains the analysis of the assumptions of his view pertaining 
to the nature of the mind. According to the most important of those assump-
tions, rules causally influence thought and action. In the third part of the paper, 
it is argued that this claim should be regarded merely as a useful idealisation.
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Streszczenie:
Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza stanowiska metodologicznego przyjmowane-
go przez Josepha Raza w jego badaniach nad prawem. W pierwszej części arty-
kułu szkicowo przedstawione zostały podstawowe założenia antynaturalizmu Raza. 
Szczególna uwaga poświęcona została pojęciu racji, ponieważ to właśnie ono 
znajduje się w centrum koncepcji wyjaśnienia prawa tego filozofa. W drugiej części 
artykułu zwrócono uwagę na te konsekwencje jego poglądów, które dotyczą natury 
umysłu. Najważniejsze z nich to założenie o faktycznym wpływie reguł na myślenie 
oraz działanie. W części trzeciej owo założenie poddane zostało krytycznej analizie, 
zgodnie z którą traktować je należy jedynie jako użyteczną idealizację.
Słowa kluczowe: 
Joseph Raz, antynaturalizm prawniczy, normatywizm, racje, wewnętrzny punkt 
widzenia na prawo
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1. Introduction
I will hereafter understand antinaturalism in the 
philosophy of law as a methodological stand-
point, according to which the satisfactory expla-
nation of law is evaluative. In my analysis, I will 
focus on antinaturalism of Joseph Raz. Raz’s 
standpoint in this matter seems to be represent-
ative for quite a large group of philosophers – not 
only philosophers of law. As it will turn out, this 
type of antinaturalism can be applied to social 
sciences in general[1]. In a nutshell, Raz claims 
that in order to explain the law, it is necessary to 
specify how the legal rules – understood as rea-
sons – influence action. According to him, ex-
planation of this phenomenon inevitably leads 
to evaluative analyses, i.e. analyses whether a 
given action is right or justified. So, on the one 
hand, legal rules are understood here as caus-
ally influencing the action  – as action’s motives. 
On the other hand, explanation based on legal 
rules is different from causal explanation, as the 
latter does not necessarily involve evaluation.
Despite the intuitive attractiveness of Raz’s 
views, his version of antinaturalism – as it will be 
argued – loses credibility when it is assessed in 
the context of contemporary empirical sciences 
of the mind. The key assumption of Raz’s con-
ception (as well as the conceptions of many oth-
er methodological antinaturalists who share his 
views) pertains to the nature of the human mind; 
it states that the human mind is able to identify 
1Philosophers whose views are similar to Raz’s in this context 
are, for example, Ch. Korsgaard (The Normative Constitution of 
Agency (2014), in: Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy 
of Michael Bratman, eds. Vargas, M. , Yaffe, G., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 190–214), R. Wedgwood (The Nature 
of Normativity, Clarendon Press, (2007) Oxford), J. Broome 
(Reasons (2004), in: Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral 
Philosophy of Joseph Raz, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
28–55), or Millar, A., (Understanding People. Normativity and 
Rationalizing Explanation, (2004) Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
the rules relevant to thought and action, and re-
spond to them in an appropriate manner. If we 
adopt this assumption, we should agree with its 
following consequence: explanation of the hu-
man mind requires referring to these rules. How-
ever, determining the rules of thought or action 
eludes scientific explanation of the mind, as the 
goal of this explanation is to establish the facts 
concerning the mind, not the rules which should 
underpin its functioning. As it is sometimes men-
tioned, empirical sciences explore the reality 
as it is, and not as it should be. However, there 
are reasons to reject this view which can be de-
scribed as normativism about the mental. 
Basic assumptions of Raz’s methodological 
antinaturalism will be presented in the first 
part of the article. Particular attention will be 
paid to the concept of reason, as it is a cru-
cial feature of his views on the explanation of 
law. The second part of the paper contains 
the analysis of these assumptions of his views 
which pertain to the nature of the mind. The 
most important assumption will be the already 
mentioned understanding of the influence of 
rules on thought and action. This assumption 
will be critically analysed in more detail in the 
third part of the paper. In the last part of the 
paper I will argue that – despite various doubts 
concerning the assumption mentioned – it is 
essential to understand what the law is, as it 
provides conceptual tools necessary to explain 
the legal rules’ influence on behaviour.
2. Joseph Raz’s normativism
Raz claims that whenever we explain purpose-
ful or intentional behaviour, it is necessary to 
refer to its reason[2]. This is a rather noncon-
2Raz, J. (2009) Reason: Explanatory and Normative, in: New 
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troversial claim – not only in the philosophical 
context, also in ... in the sciences of the mind 
and behavior[3]. Thus, there is an important dif-
ference in the explanation of intentional and un-
intentional behaviour. In the first case, describ-
ing the reasoning of a given person is crucial 
for the explanation; the reasoning which led to 
taking a certain action, that is what the person 
took into consideration, what he or she claimed 
to be justified or reasonable, what he or she 
considered as reason for the action. Hence, 
almost by definition, we are always aware of 
the reasons for our actions. Using a metaphor 
proposed by Herbert L. A. Hart, popular in the 
philosophy of law, explanation based on rea-
sons is the explanation from the internal point 
of view, that is from the point of view of the per-
son whose action is being explained[4]. On the 
other hand, to explain unintentional behaviour, 
an ‘ordinary’ type of cause – such as personality 
trait, unconscious or biological factors influenc-
ing this behaviour – is sufficient. This type of is 
made from the external, scientific point of view. 
Identifying the causes of behaviour which the 
target person may be unaware of is one of the 
interesting aspects of the explanation from the 
external point of view. Raz claims that explana-
tion of the law should be conducted from the 
internal point of view – that is from the point of 
view of people who practice law, recognize legal 
rules as reasons of actions and follow them in 
their actions[5].
Essays on the Explanation of Action, ed. Sandis, C. Palgrave 
MacMillan, Basingstoke, p. 184. 
3Malle, B. (2004) How the Mind Explains Behaviour. Folk 
Explanations, Meaning and Social Interaction, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, p. 6–27.
4Hart, H. L. A. (2012) The Concept of Law, ed. 3, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 89–91.
5Raz, J. (1975) Practical Reason and Norms, Hutchinson, 
Underscoring the function of reasons in ex-
plaining the action does not yet make Raz’s 
stance antinaturalistic. Despite the difficulties 
in determining what reasons are (e.g. difficul-
ties pertaining to the explanation of how con-
sciousness affects one’s behaviour),  reasons 
may be understood causally – i.e. as mental 
states that influence thought and action. Be-
liefs or intentions may be such mental states. 
For example, if we want to explain why a given 
person behaved lawfully, we may refer to his or 
her belief that a given legal rule is valid. What is 
more, this belief may be understood as a phys-
ical state of this person; we might assume that 
it was a state of his or her brain. Therefore, this 
understanding of reasons seems to be recon-
cilable with the contemporary sciences of the 
mind. Indeed, reasons understood as mental 
states are an essential part of the scientific ex-
planation of  the mind[6].
Raz does not, however, agree that all reasons 
– that we refer to in the explanation from the 
internal point of view – are beliefs; embracing 
his terminology, not all reasons are ‘explana-
tory reasons’. In his opinion, they have this ex-
planatory function only because there is some-
thing even more basic than themselves  – i.e. 
‘normative reasons’. Raz’s antinaturalism is 
grounded in the discinction between explana-
tory reasons and normative ones, as well as his 
understanding of the latter. Namely, normative 
reasons have a very special, dual role. They are 
used both  in explaining the action, but also, 
and primarily, in its assessment – that is de-
termining whether it was right, reasonable or 
justified. Moreover, in Raz’s opinion, it is the 
London, p. 171.
6Crane, T. (2016) The Mechanical Mind. A Philosophical Introduction 
to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation, ed. 3, Routledge, 
New York, p. 4. 
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second, evaluative role of normative reasons 
that enables them to be explanatory[7]. In other 
words, the explanatory function of the norma-
tive reasons is secondary.
Normative reasons are not beliefs but some-
thing that grounds beliefs. Therefore, these 
reasons are more basic than beliefs. Accord-
ing to Raz, ‘normative reason is a fact that – if 
someone acts on its basis – gives a purpose 
or a cause to this action, and this action is 
taken because of this cause or in pursuit of 
this target’[8]. As an example, according to the 
Polish Code of civil procedure, if one does not 
understand the sentencing part of the judge-
ment in a case in which he participates as a 
party, they can file a motion for the justifica-
tion of the judgement within seven days upon 
receiving the sentencing part. In this case, this 
legal regulation is a fact constituting the reason 
for action of a party. On the other hand, the 
party’s belief that he or she has this right is not 
such a fact; the fact in question, or the reason 
for action, exists regardless of whether he or 
she is aware of its existence. 
As normative reasons are facts, let us call 
these reasons for action ’normative facts’. Tak-
ing into consideration that normative reasons 
are facts – i.e. they are objective –  they are, in 
a way, good reasons by definition. This makes 
normative reasons as being able not only to 
explain the action, but also to assess it. Raz 
claims that:
One may say that reasons for a belief are those 
facts which explain the believing, meaning the 
acquisition of the belief when it was rationally 
7Raz, J. Reason: Explanatory and Normative, p. 188. 
8Ibidem, p. 184.
induced. But this view allows that ‘reasons’ 
is ambiguous between explanatory reasons, 
which, presumably, can explain all beliefs, 
and normative reasons for belief, which also 
explain those beliefs which were rationally ar-
rived at, that is beliefs arrived at because of 
reasons for the beliefs (and the same can be 
said of the explanation of why one rationally 
sustains certain beliefs when the explanation 
invokes reasons for those beliefs). Regarding 
the latter kind of reasons their ability to explain 
the believing depends on the fact that they are 
normative reasons, reasons which can justify a 
belief, whether or not they also explain it, and 
which explain beliefs as rational or justified be-
cause they are normative reasons[9].
In other words, the normative reasons are ob-
jective criteria of evaluating the action. If the 
reasons were only explanatory, they could 
then also be bad reasons, as the actions are 
sometimes undertaken without due considera-
tion. The normative facts are the foundation 
for explanation and assessment of the be-
liefs, yet they cannot be explained by beliefs. 
Consequently, the normative facts cannot be 
understood as something grounded in beliefs 
on what is right, rational or justified. In order 
to explain the behaviour using normative rea-
sons, in the first place it is necessary to deter-
mine what these reasons are in the context of 
a given action, that is what are the normative 
facts related to it.
Using the above scheme of Raz’s conception, 
we may already notice why his stance on ex-
plaining law should be considered methodo-
logical antinaturalism. It is not the goal of the 
scientific explanation to determine what is right, 
rational or justified – at least on its conventional 
9Ibidem, p. 189.
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understanding. Still, it difficult to understand 
why Raz claims that normative facts are essen-
tial for explaining the action and why they are 
primary, that is irreducible to the level of beliefs 
on these facts. A weaker interpretation of these 
facts is prima facie possible – that is under-
standing them as something based on beliefs of 
the persons whom these facts concern. 
Raz analyses an example that well illustrates 
our foregoing discussion. Let us focus on the 
below explanations of action
1. The subject did that, as he was con-
vinced that R.
2. The subject did that, as he was wrongly 
convinced that R (where R is the reason for 
action)[10].
Clearly, these explanations differ. The first ex-
planation is based only on the explanatory rea-
son, while the second one is based on the nor-
mative reason. According to Raz, the second 
explanation is more comprehensive or more 
exhaustive than the first one. Clearly, in some 
circumstances, explanation of the actions re-
ferring to (1) can also be adequate. Raz does 
not enumerate these circumstances, however, 
we may guess that it generally concerns situa-
tions when it is sufficient to explain the behav-
iour from the external point of view. And thus, 
explanation (1) is insufficient in the context of 
law; it only answers the question of the motives 
of acting in accordance with the law. No doubt 
such a question would be interesting for a psy-
chologist or a sociologist of law. However, we 
may answer more questions which are inter-
esting for a lawyer or a legal philosopher when 
we use explanation (2); particularly, we may 
determine whether the rule that was a motive 
of one’s action was legal or not. 
10Ibidem, p. 198.
It is worth pointing out that Raz’s proposition is 
antinaturalistic not only in methodological di-
mension. Considering his description normative 
facts, his concept is antinaturalistic also in the 
ontological dimension. If the normative facts ex-
ist independently from the views of the people 
they concern, they are ontologically basic. 
The problems regarding such an ontological 
extravagance are well known. Among other, 
they concern the problem of recognizing the 
normative facts. In this context, it seems that 
we have to use questionable metaphors, like 
‘grasping’ these facts by the mind. Difficul-
ties also concern the problem of causal influ-
ence of the normative facts. After all, it is es-
sential for Raz’s conception to assume that 
at least sometimes people not only recognize 
these normative facts but are also motivated 
by them; if these facts were not motivating, it 
would be impossible to use them to evaluate or 
justify an action – it would violate the principle 
’ought implies can’. However, the most funda-
mental problem concerning Raz’s conception 
is related to his methodological antinaturalism. 
What is more, ontological antinaturalism of this 
philosopher is seems to be only a derivative of 
his methodological antinaturalism.
3.  The mind from the normativity 
perspective
According to Raz, referring to normative facts 
allows us to... explain a significant feature of 
the mind which eludes its scientific explana-
tion, i.e. that our thinking may be motivated by 
rules. In this context, Raz refers to the way that 
the beliefs are formulated:
Reason explanations explain action and belief 
by reference to their inherent features. After all, 
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it is inherent to beliefs that those having them 
take them to be warranted, and would aban-
don them had they thought that they were un-
warranted. Similarly, by their nature intentions 
to act involve belief in reasons for the intended 
action. Hence, reason-explanations deepen 
our understanding of intentions, actions and 
beliefs, by contributing to an understanding of 
whether they have the features which they pur-
port to have[11].
Explanation based on the normative reasons is 
more comprehensive than explanation based 
only on beliefs, as it not only tells why a person 
has a certain belief, but also if the belief has its 
inherent feature, i.e. if it is justified.
According to Raz, explaining the action from 
the internal point of view refers to the norma-
tive reasons only because they can be used to 
evaluate the action. The understanding of the 
nature of beliefs is key in this matter. Accord-
ing to Raz, if a person is confident about some-
thing, by definition he or she considers his or 
her belief as justified. However, if the person will 
discover evidence undermining her belief, she 
will no longer have this belief. In other words, a 
thought is a belief only when it ‘aims at truth’.
Raz is one of many philosophers who claim 
that beliefs and truth are closely related. Usu-
ally, they reckon that this relation may only be 
explained by ascribing beliefs some normative 
features[12]. It means that if the beliefs are to 
11Ibidem.
12Wedgwood, R. (2002) The Aim of Belief, Philosophical 
Perspectives, vol. 16, p. 267–297; Boghossian, P. (2003) The 
Normativity of Content, Philosophical Issues, vol. 13, p. 31–45; 
Gibbard, A. (2003) Thoughts and Norms, Philosophical Issues, 
vol. 13, p. 83–98; Shah, N. (2003) How Truth Governs Belief, 
The Philosophical Review, vol. 112, p. 447–482; Engel, P. (2004) 
Truth and the Aim of Belief, in: Laws and Models in Science, ed. 
represent the reality accurately, their formation 
should be subject to certain rules. Certainly, 
normativity is an intuitive feature of beliefs, as 
we often describe them as correct or incorrect, 
rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. It 
suggests that the formation of beliefs is actually 
subject to the rules of correctness, rationality or 
adequate justification. It is worth to draw atten-
tion to three issues that pertain to the thesis of 
beliefs’ normativity. Firstly, the analyses lead-
ing to embracing this thesis are usually not of a 
purely conceptual character;  normativity is as-
cribed to  beliefs understood as mental states of 
a person. Secondly, if belief formation is subject 
to rules, they play a causal part in the process of 
formation of these beliefs; this is related to the 
principle ‘ought implies can’. If we evaluate be-
liefs, taking into consideration certain normative 
standards (e.g. classic logic or probability cal-
culus), the reasonableness of such an evalua-
tion is based on the assumption that the beliefs 
in question can be formed as a result of recog-
nizing and following the rules of this standard.
There are numerous arguments supporting the 
thesis of the normativity of beliefs – a thesis 
adopted by Raz. Let us focus on two of them, 
namely the argument from holism of beliefs 
and the argument from transparency of be-
liefs. The argument from holism of beliefs re-
fers to intuition, according to which  beliefs of 
a person are connected with each other. For 
example, if a person believes that p, she usu-
ally will have beliefs that can be inferred from 
p. In order to illustrate this, let us imagine that 
we implanta false belief into someone, the con-
tent of which is ‘I have a brother in Warsaw’[13]. 
Gillies, D., London, p. 77–97; Whiting D. (2010) Should I Believe 
the Truth?, Dialectica, vol. 64, p. 213–224.
13D. Dennett described a similar thought experiment in Brain 
Writing and Mind Reading, in: Language, Mind and Knowledge, 
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This belief is false because our victim does not 
have any siblings. Wondering what would hap-
pen with this belief, we will probably come to 
the conclusion that two options are available. 
Either it will be eliminated or supporting beliefs 
will be built around it which will explain not only 
why our victim has never seen her.... brother, 
but also numerous other issues concerning 
this mysterious situation – what will alleviate 
the cognitive dissonance. The supporters of 
the thesis of the normativity of belief claim that 
beliefs’ holism points to the fact that they are 
formed according to various rules of rationality, 
for example in accordance with the how with 
the world is or the laws of logic.
The argument from transparency of beliefs also 
pertains to our intuitions concerning the forma-
tion of these mental states. The transparency 
of beliefs means that if we wonder whether we 
should believe that p, it essentially boils down 
to the consideration if p. As Jonathan Adler ob-
serves in this context:
From the first-person point of view, what I be-
lieve is just how things are, not how I concep-
tualize, interpret, or theorize my experience. 
Belief aspires to be transparent to the world. 
When I believe that p (e.g., the Yankees beat 
the Mets), then, briefly, things are for me this 
way: p (the Yankees did beat the Mets). In be-
lief’s everyday roles, prominently as guides to 
action, one sees through one’s attitude to the 
world without seeing that attitude[14].
If the beliefs are transparent, then the consid-
eration if p boils down to looking for reasons 
ed. Gunderson, K. (1975), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy 
in Science, 7, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 
403–416.
14Adler, J. (2002) Belief’s Own Ethics, Cambridge, MA, p. 11. 
for p – and only reasons which adequately 
justifying that p will be taken into account. 
The transparency of beliefs means that if we 
wonder whether we should be believe that 
p, it essentially comes down to considering 
if p. Evidential reasons are then an adequate 
justification of  beliefs. An attempt to con-
vince someone using non-evidential reasons 
– such as instrumental reasons which justify 
beliefs most advantageous to achieve certain 
goals  – is doomed to fail. Evidentialism is un-
derstood here broadly as it embraces not only 
accordance with reality but also with the rules 
of rationality proposed by various normative 
standards. 
Thus, from the first-person perspective  – let us 
repeat that in Raz’s opinion this perspective is 
key to understand the law and other social phe-
nomena – it seems impossible to allow  non-
evidential reasons in considerations whether 
p. Moreover, it seems psychologically impos-
sible from this perspective to believe that p if 
we do not have sufficient evidential reasons for 
p. On the other hand, embracing the third-per-
son perspective seems to allow non-evidential 
reasons in the justification of beliefs. In order 
to illustrate the difference between the first-
person and third-person perspectives, let us 
imagine the following  situation: S is going to a 
job interview for a position that nine other per-
sons apply for. All the candidates have similar 
skills and job experience, so each of them has 
10% chance of getting the job. However, the 
persons who are self-confident during the job 
interview,  increase their chances of success. 
Assuming that S is well aware of this situation, 
we may ask a question whether he should be 
confident that he will get the job. From the psy-
chological point of view, it seems that S will 
be able to consider this only in the context of 
evidential reasons  which are too weak to jus-
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tify his confidence that he will get the job. Due 
to a considerable number of other candidates, 
his chances of getting the job are quite low. 
However, from the third-person perspective it 
seems that he should be confident of getting 
the job as his purpose is to work there, and be-
ing confident about it increases his chances of 
achieving his goal.
4.  Normativity and the cognitive 
sciences
The normativity of beliefs understood in this 
way raises numerous doubtsand two... of them 
seem particularly important. The first doubt 
pertains to the fact that according to this thesis 
the mind has a feature which seems to evade 
the scientific method. For the scientific method 
allows to establish the facts regarding a given 
phenomenon, and establishing the valid rules 
pertaining to this phenomenon  – e.g. the rules 
of thought –  outreaches the domain of facts. 
This consequence of the thesis that belief is 
normative raises doubts, as it is based on con-
ceptual intuitions pertaining to  how the mind 
works. It seems, however, that such intuition 
give only a limited insight into how the mind ac-
tually works. The second doubt indicates that 
people often make mistakes in the process of 
belief formation – as numerous empirical stud-
ies show. For example, according to one of the 
important psychological research programmes, 
called  ‘heuristics and biases’,  people system-
atically make mistakes in reasoning and deci-
sion-making. Therefore, the assumption that all 
beliefs are subject to the rules of correctness or 
rationality seems too strong. 
Commenting on these doubts, we should in-
dicate that in the cognitive sciences the as-
sumption that rules of rationality play a causal 
role in human thought is not rare[15]. For ex-
ample, the aforementioned ‘heuristics and bi-
ases’ research programme is based on such 
an assumption. Assessing the correctness of 
reasoning, judgement or decision from the 
perspective of a certain normative standard – 
such as logic or probability calculus – would 
be unreasonable if people could not follow the 
rules proposed by this pattern. In other words, 
discarding the assumption that thinking is sub-
ject to rules makes it difficult to claim that a 
given reasoning is true or false.
It is reasonable to differentiate between two 
understandings of the normativity of belief – 
strong and weak. The strong version of this 
thesis, assumed by Raz, consists in the claim 
that the normative facts explain the way hu-
man mind works. These normative facts may 
take various forms – e.g. they may be the rules 
of reasoning, legal rules or moral rules. Such 
rules are considered to be similar to laws which 
describe how the mind works. The weak ver-
sion of the thesis that beliefs are normative 
only states that these rules are merely the 
idealisation of how the mind actually works. 
In other words, the idea that people are mo-
tivated by the normative facts is based on a 
commonsensical model of the mind which is 
sometimes very useful, and at times even es-
sential. For example, this model is helpful in 
order to explain the law or even commonsensi-
cally understand one’s behaviour from the in-
ternal point of view; however, we should not 
mistake the model with the object to which 
it pertains. It seems that this is the way psy-
15Chater, N., Oaksford, M. (2003) The Rational Analysis of 
Human Cognition, in: Reason and Nature. Essays in the Theory 
of Rationality, Bermudez, J. L. , Millar, A. (eds.), Oxford, p. 
135–174; Stanovich, K., West, R. (2000) Individual Differences in 
Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, vol. 23, p. 645–726..
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chologists understand the mind when studying 
human rationality. They imply that human mind 
is subject to the rationality rules; and thus, they 
can assess its operations according to various 
normative standards. However, they are simul-
taneously aware that it is only an idealisation. 
Moreover, numerous studies within the afore-
mentioned ‘heuristics and biases’ research 
paradigm suggest that this idealisation is quite 
strong. Let us mention a widely discussed ex-
ample of such astudy, connected with the phe-
nomenon of belief bias.
Belief bias is a tendency to prioritise the plau-
sibility of the conclusion of reasoning over the 
validity of its logical structure when assessing 
its correctness. This is one of the best evi-
denced phenomena within the psychology... 
of reasoning. This effect may be noticed when 
people solve syllogisms. The tasks of solving 
syllogistic reasoning consist assessing wheth-
er the conclusion follows from the premises. 
Moreover, the participants are informed that 
only the given premises are relevant to evalu-
ate the correctness reasoning[16]. In a classic 
study of this type, the participants are present-
ed with the following syllogisms:
Syllogism I:
(P1) No addictive things are inexpensive.
(P2) Some cigarettes are inexpensive.
(C) Some addictive things are not cigarettes.
Syllogism II:
(P1) No cigarettes are inexpensive.
(P2) Some addictive things are inexpensive.
(C) Some cigarettes are not addictive things.
The structure of these syllogisms is as follows:
16Evans, J., Over, D. (1996) Rationality and Reasoning, 









Syllogism I is logically invalid. In the conclu-
sion, the major term (‘P’ – drugs) is located 
before the minor term (‘S’ – cigarettes) and 
creates a PoS... type sentence; however, it 
should be located after the minor term and 
constitute a SoP type sentence – that would 
create a correct Festino sylogism according 
to the second figure. However, 71% of the 
research participants stated that this reason-
ing is valid. Syllogism II has the same logical 
structure, thus it is also invalid, However, only 
10% of the research participants considered it 
valid[17]. The only difference between the syl-
logisms presented is in changing the name 
substituted into the major term to the name 
substituted into the minor term, as in the first 
syllogism the major term is ‘addictive things’ 
while the minor term is ‘cigarettes’, while in the 
second one the major term is ‘cigarettes’ and 
the minor one is ‘addictive things’. Despite the 
fact that the logical structure of both syllo-
gisms is the same, there is a significant differ-
ence in judging the validity of the reasonings.
We should have a look at the contents of the 
two conclusions to explain this difference. 
While the conclusion in syllogism I (‘Some ad-
dictive things are not cigarettes’) is believable, 
17Evans, J., Barston, J., Pollard, P. (1983) On the Conflict 
Between Logic and Belief in Syllogistic Reasoning, Memory and 
Cognition, vol. 11, p. 295–306.
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the conclusion in syllogism II is not (‘Some 
cigarettes are not addictive things’). There is 
an obvious interpretation of the participants’ 
answers – the conclusion consistent with their 
beliefs is judged as logically following from the 
premises, and the conclusion is inconsistent... 
with their beliefs as not logically following from 
the premises. Moreover, the premises in both 
syllogisms seem to be convincing for the par-
ticipants. Such an explanation pertains to the 
aforementioned belief bias. It is also worth 
mentioning that more believable conclusions 
are more often accepted regardless of the 
logical validity of the reasoning; however, the 
belief bias is even more distinct in the case of 
invalid reasonings[18].
A considerable number of experiments per-
taining to the limitations of human rationality is 
only one of the reasons why weak understand-
ing of the normativity of belief should be con-
sidered better justified that the strong one – as 
a feature that should be ascribed to the model 
of the mind’s, not the mind itself. The support-
ers of strong understanding of this feature of 
belief draw too far-reaching conclusions based 
on fragile foundations, both conceptual and in-
tuitive. Analysing the relation between reasons 
and beliefs, we should carefully differentiate 
the analyses of these reasons  – as for exam-
ple discussions concerning various normative 
sys- such as... logical or ethical systems – from 
the analyses concerning the question of what 
one should be confident of or how to act. The 
research on the various normative systems 
seems to be far more objective than the re-
search on the correctness of beliefs, as the 
latter will be always relativized to the certain 
18Evans, J. (2008) Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, 
Judgment, and Social Cognition, Annual Review of Psychology, 
59, p. 264. 
situation. We may sometimes have the impres-
sion that the supporters of the strong version 
of the normativity of belief confuse these two 
levels of analyses.
In conclusion, if we assume that the research 
from the internal point of view implies com-
monsensical and in many ways imperfect 
model of the mind and it is not directly con-
nected with the object that the model refers to, 
it is then difficult to agree with Raz who claims 
that explaining the action has to be necessarily 
based on the irreducible category of normative 
facts. On the other hand, he reasonably claims 
that – embracing first-person perspective – the 
normativity of beliefs is a feature of the mind. 
This may lead to the conclusion that the nor-
mative facts do exist, and at least sometimes 
the mind is able to grasp them – and as a re-
sult, they influence thought and action. 
5.  Folk model of the mind and the 
scientific explanation
The folk model of the human mind is an es-
sential point of reference in the research on 
law. This model is assumed when we study 
law from an internal point of view. The model, 
according to which people have beliefs, inten-
tions and other mental states that impact upon 
their thoughts and actions, is, however, an ide-
alisation. We should not expect that the  mental 
states it posits – acceptance of the legal rule is 
a good example here – can be fully operation-
alised in the context of empirical sciences of 
the mind. However, the difficulties concerning 
naturalisation of these mental states do not 
seem to be related to the existence of norma-
tive facts  which are somehow grasped by the 
mind, and which cannot be a part of the sci-
entific image of the world. These difficulties 
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result rather from the inadequacy of the folk 
understanding of the mind. In other words, the 
description of the behaviour from the exter-
nal point of view does not let us to take into 
account many features of this behaviour that 
would be interesting in the legal context.
According to Raz, acceptance of the legal rule 
is a useful conceptual tool in searching for 
answers to a lot of traditional, philosophical 
questions concerning law. This view is based 
on the following, plausible assumption: the 
determination whether a given rule is legal or 
not depends on the beliefs concerning this rule 
shared by at least some of the participants in 
the legal practice. Thus, it is irrelevant whether 
the majority of the community members ac-
cept the rule as a legal  in order to judge if a 
whole community does so. Raz shares a view 
characteristic for many contemporary positiv-
ists – that  the key issue here is the accept-
ance of the people using legal rules, primarily 
the judges[19].
At this point, it would be worth to distinguish 
between believing that a given rule is legal and 
accepting this rule as  legal. This differentiation 
will illustrate the incompleteness of explana-
tion of behaviour in the legal context from the 
external point of view. Jonathan Cohen car-
ried out one of the most exhaustive analyses 
concerning the differences between those two 
concepts and his proposition will be the basis 
of the following discussion[20].
According to Cohen, the ‘belief that p’ is a dis-
position to believe that p is true and not-p is 
19Raz, J. (1975) Practical Reason and Norms, Hutchinson, 
London, p. 171.
20Cohen, J. (1995) An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
false. Thus, we may call this disposition an ‘af-
fective disposition’. Equating the beliefs with 
the disposition to have some kind of feelings 
explains some of the features often ascribed to 
beliefs. What is particularly important, the af-
fective disposition is not controlled by the per-
son having it, similarly to the process of creat-
ing beliefs, as it may seem. In order to justify 
the claim about the automatism of belief for-
mation, the argument mentioned above is key; 
i.e. that it is impossible to believe in something 
we consider false. The beliefs are formed on 
the basis of premises which pertain to the way 
the reality is presented to the person and she 
cannot influence it.
On the other hand, beliefs somehow seem to 
arise from conscious, controlled reasoning. 
According to Cohen, such mental phenomena 
should be called acceptances, not beliefs. He 
claims that:
To accept that p is to have or adopt a policy of 
deeming, positing, or proposing that p-i.e. of 
including that proposition or rule among one’s 
premisses for deciding what to do or think in a 
particular context, whether or not one feels it to 
be true that p[21].
Acceptance is different from assumption, sup-
position and conjecture, as these attitudes are 
temporary and usually embraced only in rela-
tion to a specific issue. For example, assump-
tion is correct when we try to check if certain 
solutions of the problem are justified. Hence, 
we may assume that voluntarism concern-
ing beliefs – according to which the process 
of creating beliefs is subject to control – is 
justified. This way, we may check if embrac-
ing this view leads to contradiction. Whereas, 
21Ibidem, p. 4. 
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acceptance is a permanent commitment to 
take actions and think according to a particu-
lar pattern; this commitment requires to firmly 
embrace a judgement as a premise in judging 
or making decisions.
Comparing the discussed mental states ena-
bles a more precise characteristics of belief 
and acceptance. It will allow to indicate the 
similarities and differences between them 
more clearly. In relation to the similarities, 
both beliefs and acceptances can be justified, 
however, having such a justification is not a 
condition necessary to possess them[22]. What 
is also important, usually both types of mental 
states – with the same content – occur simul-
taneously. Sometimes it will be difficult to in-
trospectively determine if a given state is a be-
lief or acceptance. The belief that p is usually 
a premise for the acceptance that p – in this 
situation we may say that the belief changed 
into acceptance; and acceptance that p may 
become a premise for a belief that p. 
However, according to Cohen, there is a sig-
nificant difference between premises justify-
ing beliefs and acceptances. As a result of 
the connection between beliefs and truth, the 
premises supporting beliefs are evidential, 
which means they are sufficient reasons to 
acknowledge the truthfulness of those beliefs. 
On the other hand, acceptances depend on 
the context and are embraced basing not only 
on evidential premises but also on common-
sensical..., instrumental or ethical ones. For 
example, an advocate may accept the fact 
that his client is innocent in order to take his 
case. This premise will play a significant part 
in this lawyer’s decision making process on 
this case, despite the fact that he may believe 
22Ibidem, p. 16.
that his client is guilty.
With some slight modifications, the described 
concepts of belief and acceptance are useful 
conceptual tools to indicate the features char-
acteristic for explaining behaviour based on 
the folk model of the mind. The modification 
mentioned regards Raz’s understanding of ac-
ceptance; he claims that accepting the legal 
rule occurs regardless of the context. Accept-
ing the legal rule leads to – among others – re-
jecting all the extra-legal reasons which would 
be inconsistent with the accepted legal rule[23]. 
The impact of the belief that a given rule is 
legal on behaviour can be explained from the 
external point of view. However, an analogous 
explanation concerning the legal rule accept-
ance is impossible. In the case of beliefs, this 
explanation will be causal, so it will explain how 
something happened. In the case of accept-
ance, this explanation will essentially come 
down to justifying a behaviour and identifying 
reasons that led to this behaviour – so it will 
explain why something happened. A practical 
syllogism is a typical example of explanation 
based on acceptance. In this syllogism, the 
first premise regards the accepted facts, the 
second one – the accepted purposes, and the 
conclusion is the action taken. When people 
explain their behaviour using practical syllo-
gism, they do not indicate the causes of their 
behaviour but the reasons why they should be-
have this way. The relation between particular 
elements of this syllogism is logical or rational 
– not causal[24]. 
The difference between explanation based on 
23Raz, J. Practical Reason and Norms, p. 139.  
24Ibidem, p. 64.
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
ORIGINAL ARTICLEAntinaturalism in the legal...
213
the belief that a rule is legal and explanation 
based on the legal rule acceptance does not 
have to lead to assuming that there are norma-
tive facts that the acceptances pertain to; and, 
as a consequence, embracing methodologi-
cal antinaturalism. For example, according to 
Cohen, the reference point of the empirical re-
search on human rationality – which includes, 
among others, the ability to reason or to make 
decisions – should be the rationality rules com-
monly accepted by their users[25]. Thus, recon-
structing human rational competence not only 
boils down to the actual way of reasoning or 
making decisions, but also is a normative pat-
tern for these abilities. Here, Cohen adopts the 
principle formulated by Nelson Goodman, ac-
cording to which the rules of rationality should 
be considered correct if they correspond to a 
reasonable and commonly accepted practice 
of application of these rules[26]. In other words, 
if the rules of rationality, (in the context of this 
discussion also legal rules) are in a state of re-
flective balance – and they are when they were 
consciously and sensibly reflected on by their 
users, and then recognized as valid – these 
rules are then justified.
25Cohen, J. (1981) Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally 
Demonstrated?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 4, p. 40. 
26Goodman, N. (1983) Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, p. 67.  
6. Conclusion
The basic aim of this article was a critical anal-
ysis of methodological antinaturalism of Jo-
seph Raz concerning the research on law and 
other social phenomena. His stance is rooted 
in particular understanding of reasons for ac-
tion. He understands reasons (which include, 
among others, legal rules) as facts, independ-
ent of the beliefs of the people they pertain to. 
As argued, the main problem for Raz and other 
normativists is to explain how such facts could 
affect thought and, consequently, action. It 
seems that the supporters of methodological 
antinaturalism implausibly identify the usually 
normative authority of various rules with the 
strength of the causal influence on thought 
and action. However, if we deny that there is 
such a relation between the normative sphere 
and the psychological one (stating that, from 
the internal point of view, the research on law 
is based on adopting a folk model of the mind, 
then the reasons for which methodological an-
tinaturalism seems – at least prima facie – at-
tractive, disappear. However, it does not mean 
that the explanation based on this folk model 
of the mind can be reduced to an explanation 
from the external point of view, as there are far-
reaching differences between them in describ-
ing the phenomena explained.
References
[1] Adler, J. (2002). Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
[2] Boghossian, P. (2003). The Normativity of Content. 
Philosophical Issues, 13, p. 31–45. 
[3] Chater, N., Oaksford, M. (2003). The Rational Analysis of 
Human Cognition, in: Bermudez, J. L. , Millar, A. (eds.) 
Reason and Nature. Essays in the Theory of Rationality, p. 
134–175, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[4] Cohen, J. (1981). Can Human Irrationality Be 
Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 4, p. 317–370. 
[5] Cohen, J. (1995). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[6] Crane, T. (2016). The Mechanical Mind. A Philosophical 
Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental 
Representation. New York: Routledge.
[7] Dennett, D. (1975). Brain Writing and Mind Reading, in: 
Gunderson, K. (ed.) Language, Mind and Knowledge, 
Pol Law Rev, 2017 Vol. 3 (1), p. 201-214
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0010.7844
Antinaturalism in the legal...
214
Word count: 6800          Tables: –          Figures: –
© 2017 Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Gdansk. Published 
by Index Copernicus Sp. z o.o.  All rights reserved
The project has been financed by the National Science Centre under  
Decision No. DEC-2012/04 / A / HS5 / 00655.
The content of the journal „Polish Law Review’ is circulated on the basis of 
the Open Access which means free and limitless access to scientific data.
This material is available under the Creative Commons - Attribution 4.0 GB. 
The full terms of this license are available on: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode
Łukasz Kurek; Department of Philosophy of Law and Legal Ethics at the 
Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland; e-mail: lukaszkurek1@gmail.com
https://polishlawreview.pl/resources/html/articlesList?issueId=10603
Kurek Ł.: Antinaturalism in the legal philosophy of Joseph Raz; Pol Law Rev, 




Table of contents 2017:
Cite this article as: 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 
403–416.
[8] Engel, P. (2004). Truth and the Aim of Belief, in: Gillies, D. 
(ed.) Laws and Models in Science, London: King’s College 
Publications, p. 77–97.
[9] Evans, J. (2008). Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, 
Judgment and Social Cognition. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 59, p. 255–278. 
[10] Evans, J., Barston, J., Pollard (1983). On the Conflict 
Between Logic and Belief in Syllogistic Reasoning, 
Memory and Cognition, 11, p. 295–306. 
[11] Evans, J., Over, D. (1996). Rationality and Reasoning. 
Hove: Psychology Press.
[12] Gibbard, A. (2003). Thoughts and Norms. Philosophical 
Issues, 13, p. 83–98.
[13] Goodman, N. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[14] Hart, H. L. A. (2012). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
[15] Malle, B. (2004). How the Mind Explains Behaviour. Folk 
Explanations, Meaning and Social Interaction. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
[16] Raz, J. (1975). Practical Reason and Norms. London: 
Hutchinson.
[17] Raz, J. (2009). Reasons: Explanatory and Normative, in: 
Sandis, C., New Essays on the Explanation of Action, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 184–202.
[18] Shah, N. (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. The 
Philosophical Review, 112, p. 447–482. 
[19] Stanovich, K., West, R. (2000). Individual Differences 
in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726.
[20] Wedgwood, R. (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical 
Perspectives, 16, 267–297.
[21] Whiting, D. (2010). Should I Believe the Truth? Dialectica, 
64, p. 64, 213–224.
